J. Lucas Reddinger

Teamwork requires more than the general skills that team members bring. In successful teams, members invest in team-specific skill or capital that accumulates within the team and raises the return to coordinated production. We provide the first systematic analysis of dynamic investment in such team skill. Adopting a dynamic game approach, we develop a novel theoretical framework where investment in team skill creates persistent benefits but is risky because the benefits depend on successful team coordination. We then take this framework to the laboratory to study empirically the factors that influence dynamic investment in team skill. We find underinvestment compared to the efficient benchmark. However, investment responds strongly to incentives, in line with specific theory-predicted patterns. Pre-registered traits (theory of mind and propensity to coordinate) predict investment and team-level efficiency. We conclude that careful design of team incentives and selection of team members can facilitate the development of team skill.

Is an option especially tempting when it is both immediate and certain? I test the effect of risk on the present-bias factor under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In my experiment workers allocate about thirty to fifty minutes of real-effort tasks between two weeks. I study dynamic consistency by comparing choices made two days in advance of the workday with choices made when work is imminent. My novel design permits estimation of present bias using a decision with a consequence that is both immediate and certain. I find far greater present bias when the consequence is certain, with broad implications for any economic decision involving a present-biased individual. I offer a methodological remedy for experimental economists.

We experimentally investigate how confidence over multiple priors affects belief updating. Theory predicts that the average Bayesian posterior is unaffected by confidence over multiple priors if average priors are the same. We manipulate confidence by varying the time subjects view a black-and-white grid, the proportion representing the prior in a Bernoulli distribution. We find that when subjects view the grid for a longer duration, they have more confidence, under-update more, and place more (less) weight on priors (signals). Overall, confidence over multiple priors matters when it should not, while confidence in prior beliefs does not matter when it should.

Vaccination against infectious diseases has both private and public benefits. We study whether social preferences—concerns for the well-being of other people—are associated with one's decision regarding vaccination. We measure these social preferences for 549 online subjects with a public-good game and an altruism game. To the extent that one gets vaccinated out of concern for the health of others, contribution in the public-good game is analogous to an individual's decision to obtain vaccination, while our altruism game provides a different measure of altruism, equity, and efficiency concerns. We proxy vaccine demand with how quickly a representative individual voluntarily took the initial vaccination for COVID-19 (after the vaccine was widely available). We collect COVID-19 vaccination history separately from the games to avoid experimenter-demand effects. We find a strong result: Contribution in the public-good game is associated with greater demand to voluntarily receive a first dose, and thus also to vaccinate earlier. Compared to a subject who contributes nothing, one who contributes the maximum ($4) is 58% more likely to obtain a first dose voluntarily in the four-month period that we study (April through August 2021). In short, people who are more pro-social are more likely to take a voluntary COVID-19 vaccination. Behavior in our altruism game does not predict vaccination. We recommend further research on the use of pro-social preferences to help motivate individuals to vaccinate for other transmissible diseases, such as the flu and HPV.

Widespread vaccination is certainly a critical element in successfully fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. We apply theories of social identity to design targeted messaging to reduce vaccine hesitancy among groups with low vaccine uptake, such as African Americans and political conservatives. We conducted an online experiment from April 7 to 27, 2021, that oversampled Black, Latinx, conservative, and religious U.S. residents. We first solicited the vaccination status of over 10,000 individuals. Of the 4,609 individuals who reported being unvaccinated, 4,190 enrolled in our covariate-adaptive randomized trial. We provided participants messages that presented the health risks of COVID-19 to oneself and others; they also received messages about the benefits of a COVID-19 vaccine and an endorsement by a celebrity. Messages were randomly tailored to each participant’s identities—Black, Latinx, conservative, religious, or being a parent. Respondents reported their intent to obtain the vaccine for oneself and, if a parent, for one’s child. We report results for the 2,621 unvaccinated respondents who passed an incentivized manipulation check. We find no support for the hypothesis that customized messages or endorsers reduce vaccine hesitancy among our segments. A post hoc analysis finds evidence that a vaccine endorsement from Dr. Fauci reduces stated intent to vaccinate among conservatives. We find no evidence that tailoring public-health communication regarding COVID-19 vaccination for broad demographic groups would increase its effectiveness. We recommend further research on communicators and endorsers, as well as incentives.